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Fight the power: how CAGE resists from within a
“suspect community”
Asim Qureshi1
ABSTRACT Against the backdrop of the War on Terror, the British government has
introduced a strict counter-terrorism regime that has disproportionately targeted Muslim
communities through on-going practices of racialization and surveillance. This paper exam-
ines the ways in which grassroots organizations have developed responses and strategies to
resist counter-terrorism policy and state Islamophobia in the context of the United Kingdom
and the United States. The paper uses a practitioner’s perspective to locate real-life
experiences of working within such an organization, as a means to understand the complex
processes by which structural power is exercised to suppress legitimate voices of colour
seeking to critique policy and practice. It examines the consequences of such silencing and
the wider risks this poses for dissent and debate in democratic societies.
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Introduction
O
n 11 September 2001, the attacks perpetrated against the
United States by non-state actors heralded a “state of
exception” resulting in governments around the world
instituting counter-terrorism policies in almost every aspect of
public life at an unprecedented global level (Agamben, 2005;
Wuchte, 2014). The widespread agreement between states and
international organisations has resulted in a “sprawling ofﬁcial
“counter terrorism” apparatus” that perpetuates and produces
Islamophobia (Sayyid, 2010; Massoumi et al., 2017). Ultimately,
these policies can be seen as resulting in structural racism, as
institutions, both public and private coalesce to suspect speciﬁc
communities (Powell, 2007:796; Pantazis and Pemberton,
2009: 646).
CAGE, formerly CagePrisoners, is an advocacy organisation
developed to resist this racism/Islamophobia within the space of
civil society, but despite this, has continued to face serious
challenges (Massoumi et al., 2015). This is not something new or
unique. History shows us that multiple movements set up to resist
racism have faced serious structural and physical violence
(Galtung, 1969: 172) by the state that seeks to suppress and
discipline legitimate voices of colour critiquing state policy and
practice (Marqusee, 2005; also Krug, 1999; and Argentine
Commission, 1986).
Using a practitioner’s auto-ethnography, this article seeks to
reﬂect on the challenges faced by CAGE to understand the nature
of the relationship between the state and “suspect communities”.
As a practitioner, the auto-ethnographic approach allows for
reﬂection based on empirical data that we have personally
gathered—this is not merely an academic exercise—as the article
will show that the consequences are real. As Tami Spry explains,
an auto-ethnography permits us to ﬁnd meaning through our
connections and disconnections by reﬂecting on our own pain
(Spry, 2011: 125).
Over the last 14 years, CAGE has had to overcome socio-
economic, political and economic barriers that are severely
impacting its daily operations and work. While theoretical models
will be relied on in this article, this paper is written from a
practitioner’s perspective and is about practitioners. It therefore
seeks to discuss our experiences as we are faced with serious
challenges by the state, and the methods we adopt in resisting
them. To do so, this article is structured in the following way: it
opens by providing an overview of who CAGE is, situating the
organisation as being an organic response to the creation of, what
Hillyard (1993) calls, a “suspect community”. Key to this situating
is to highlight how CAGE operates as an organisation engaged in
resistance that seeks to challenge structural racism and Islamo-
phobia. In the two subsequent parts, the article highlights the
ways in which violence/repression has been targeted at CAGE,
and some of the ways CAGE has resisted it. Here, the article
argues that violence and repression that has been targeted at
CAGE is very much a continuation of historic policies targeted at
people of colour/anti-racism activists in circumstances such as the
Black Civil Rights movement in the United States or the anti-
Apartheid movement in South Africa. The article concludes by
offering some thoughts on what the targeting of a group such as
CAGE, which seeks to engage in counter-hegemonic resistance
activities suggests as well as the repercussions of the state’s
coercion and violence against such resistance.
The story of CAGE
CAGE was never supposed to exist. The founders of the
organization felt that the detentions at Guantanamo Bay, starting
on11 January 2002, were a major issue of concern and would pose
long-term and far-reaching consequences for Muslims across the
globe. Owing to their concern, CAGE approached major Muslim
organisations in the United Kingdom that may have had some
mandate to be able to take on the issue. The team, however, was
met with a range of unfortunate responses including: “It is not in
our remit”, “The issue is too ‘hot’ for us”, and perhaps most
worryingly, “There is no smoke without ﬁre.” These objections
convinced the founders of CAGE that some form of Muslim-led
response was required to a Guantanamo ﬁlled with Muslims—
leading to the creation of an online information portal which
sought to document all the individuals, one by one, that were
being detained as part of the so-called “war on terror”. CAGE’s
ability to access material in both English and Arabic language
made this portal unique to the extent that the Washington Post
credited an early “deﬁnitive list” of detainees at Guantanamo Bay
to CAGE (Washington Post, 2004).
As the popularity of the website grew internationally, it became
clear there was a greater need for CAGE. We had calls from
mothers in Sudan, fathers in Bosnia and brothers in Pakistan, all
attempting to ﬁnd loved ones who had been disappeared into a
network of prisons within the global War on Terror (Qureshi,
2009). This activity led to an important question of identity for
CAGE. We understood our remit to be focusing on working for
due process, and against arbitrary detention, torture, rendition
and extra-judicial killings. CAGE did not bring these cases to
human rights organizations already operating within this terrain,
including Amnesty International and Reprieve. This is because we
felt that a voice must emerge from within the Muslim community
that was authentic, conﬁdent, and able to speak for those who
were being constructed as a “suspect community” (Peirce, 2008).
CAGE in this sense sought to become a resistance movement of
the suspect community, by the suspect community, and for the
suspect community.
CAGE’s activities are based on three platforms: knowing our
own identity, owning our own narrative, and holding the state to
account while holding true to our ethical principles. According to
Labonte et al., “storytelling has re-emerged as a method with
which people might begin to challenge dominant social discourses
(and hence social structures) through their assertion of non-
dominant cultural constructions, personal identities and world
views in the public sphere”, (Labonte et al., 2003: 34). CAGE
seeks to do exactly this through their advocacy work that
challenges and resists the unfair exercise of state power by telling
the stories of those who cannot write or share their own stories. It
is this approach of speaking for those who are powerless and
speaking inconvenient truths to power without fearing the
consequences that arguably separates CAGE from other
community-based organisations, who are often conﬂicted due
to funding they receive from the state, operate in a climate of fear
that does not permit them to challenge what they see as
governmental excess (Schneider, 1991: 115) or are often afraid of
the perceptions that their critique of the government will generate
(Independent Voices, 2015).
By being a grassroots organisation that emerged organically,
CAGE are not only free from the strings of state funding but are
able to proactively resist the structural pressures that seek to make
the powerless self-discipline and self-censor their ideas and
activities. CAGE can therefore operate with a sense of freedom
and take up cases and causes that not only seek to hold the state to
account but work to avoid reproducing reductive assumptions
about Muslims that ultimately feed structural racism and
Islamophobia by not complying with the demands and desires of
government. This allows CAGE to go further and question the very
framework on which policy-making and practice is produced in the
so-called “War on Terror”, including the governmental assessments
of the threat from non-state politically motivated violence.
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Politically motivated violence is not exceptional but rather, as
observed by Sageman (2016), a part of the milieu of violence that
is seen across the world. To talk of state violence being one of the
contributing factors to the use of politically motivated violence by
non-state actors is to essentially say that the former motivates the
latter. In other words, power is always subject to resistance when
it is unfairly exercised. In the next section of this chapter, I want
to demonstrate how one can theoretically understand CAGE’s
resistance by examining how power is exercised against the
organisation (and the “suspect community” more broadly) not by
examining how force and violence has been directly and
physically used against it but how state power operates against
it on a structural level, and especially through the medium of
“language”.
Theorising structural racism and CAGE’s resistance
I am aware always of the prevailing narrative of the media,
because it is there that we, who are not of the predominant
culture but who write in its language, who feel ourselves
always implicated in two worlds, read about ourselves
most. We know how language can be used to beat the
rhythm of the war drum, mustering ranks upon ranks of
public support. We know how language itself can wage war
against us, by mimicking the same casual dehumanization
of a bomb. Everyone you know and love: terrorists.
Militants. Strategic targets. Collateral damage. (Mounzer,
2016)
Lina Mounzer’s essay “War in Translation” encapsulates some of
the difﬁculties of living within two worlds. The struggle for
identity discussed above, crashes into a war of narrative, as
multiple forces seek to claim an epistemology of the “crisis”.
Mounzer’s tragic prose describes the pain of translating, not just
between two different languages, but also through two different
cultures, histories and reference points. It is precisely between the
intersection of language, identity and epistemology that CAGE
seeks to redress the assumptions that are made about Muslims, to
discipline them.
CAGE understand that part of the challenge of working for due
process, is to change the baseline about who Muslims are, and the
perceived threat that they allegedly pose (Sageman, 2016). CAGE
has sought to do this through the language it uses. Stylebook
decisions, for example, have meant that they removed words like
“Islamist” or “extremist” in their output and have proactively
sought to describe Muslim activity or belief through a non-
Orientalist lens. As Fanon (2001, 73) observes, this is a way of
humanizing rather than reinforcing dehumanizing narratives.
Part of the process of humanization is to therefore reject a
language that has become “common-sensical” and therefore goes
unquestioned and unchallenged. Language, in other words, is a
site through which power is exercised, and of course, a site
through which such power can be resisted. As a result, CAGE
pro-actively seeks to refrain from using terms like “extremists”,
“terrorists” and so forth and instead proactively use an alternative
language. In his important work on political Islam and de-
coloniality, Salman Sayyid very eloquently explains how the
process of using your own language is an absolutely vital
ingredient in bringing yourself into existence. He thus writes:
The act of naming is also the act of becoming. The act of
naming is an exercise in history making: only those with
names can write their own history; only those with names
can give themselves a destiny. Thus, the division of the
world between the named West and nameless non-West
becomes a division between people who have their own
history and those who do not. The name of Islam has
brought Muslims into history and, in circumstances when
the name cannot be evoked, Muslims become a 'people
without history', thus ceasing even to be a people. People
become without history not because they lack a past but
because, paradoxically, they cannot narrate themselves into
the future. People without history are either nameless (and
thus not really a people) or they are named by others
(Sayyid, 2010: 2).
If one can describe and refer to themselves only in the language
of the powerful and cannot devise their own language and
terminology, one cannot humanize themselves. Language there-
fore is not merely a medium through which an object or person is
described but rather the medium through which a particular
social reality is constructed and created (Hall, 1992: 187). This is
accomplished by devising our own language and refusing to use
the language and discourse of the “war on terror”, an example
would be useful here. By using the term “politically motivated
violence” instead of “terrorism”, CAGE are more likely to
generate more of a question in the mind of the listener/observer
around what is being discussed than the word “terrorism”, which
is often taken for granted and remains unquestioned. By using
alternative phrases and modes of language, CAGE therefore
participates in actively resisting racism and Islamophobia that
articulates itself through language and structures of power. In
other words, they seek to make an idea and/or practice visible that
is perceived as being “common-sensical” or rather “hegemonic”.
The use of an “alternative” language is therefore a way of
challenging the exercise of racism and Islamophobia that operates
structurally that reinforces notions of Muslims as a “threat”
(Massoumi et al., 2017, see Introduction). Because of CAGE’s
proactive efforts to use their own language and to make overt the
ways in which racism and Islamophobia is operating structurally,
it will come as no surprise that they have come under sustained
criticism and attack; not merely by the state’s coercive apparatus
but also through civil society.
Antonio Gramsci explored this relationship by examining
power within a political context (Buttegieg, 1995: 6)—to what
extent is civil society an actual check to power, or is it a function
that is there for the purposes of supporting power? To what
extent is civil society coerced, and indeed a tool of coercion? In
his important article that uses Gramsci’s work around the
intricate and often blurred lines between coercion and consent,
Sabir (2017: 8) demonstrates how civil society, rather then being
an independent and free space in which ideas and activities are
organised is actually one the main avenues through which the
state maintains and exercises its power and generates consent for
its ideas and activities. Civil society, in other words, is complicit
in helping the state ﬁght the so-called “war on terror”, which
makes resistance to structural modes of power even more
challenging, even when articulated non-violently and peacefully
(Sabir, 2017: 8).
This is similar to what Jules Boycoff discusses. For Boycoff
(2007: 285), repression is the coercion of dissent that is exercised
within the space of civil society. Liberal democracies, he contends,
maintain their legitimacy by using alternative means of social
control, and that is principally achieved through the regulation of
behaviour of the dissenters conforming to normative standards
(Boycoff, 2007: 303). In summary, civil society is often considered
to be a free and open space in which resistance to the government
and its policies can be exercised. However, civil society is not a
free space but rather one of avenues through which structural
violence manifests itself, especially against those who resit in non-
violent ways. As the next section of this article now discusses,
PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1057/palcomms.2017.90 ARTICLE
PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | 3:17090 |DOI: 10.1057/palcomms.2017.90 |www.nature.com/palcomms 3
history demonstrates this in relation to the conﬂict in the North
of Ireland as well as the Black Power Movement in the United
States.
Learning from history. History shows how movements resisting
non-violently and operating within the sphere of civil society have
faced repression in similar ways to what CAGE (and the Muslim
community more broadly) are facing. Here, Ireland is a notable
case. Hillyard (1993), for example, who coined the phrase “sus-
pect community” in his very important work, demonstrated how
the British state had constructed an entire community as “sus-
pect” by not distinguishing between combatants and civilians and
subjecting them across the board to highly coercive and violent
actions (Hillyard, 1993). We see the same logic at play in regards
to the treatment of the UK’s Muslim communities too, and how
even those operating peacefully in civil society continue to face
repression by the state. An additional challenge that has been
faced by Muslim communities, however, is the lack of the support
they have received from prominent people. The human rights
lawyer, Gareth Peirce, whose essay “Was it like this for the Irish?”
summarized this well:
No similar [celebrity or political] allies for the Muslim
community are evident today, capable of pushing and
pulling the British government publicly or privately into
seeing sense. Spiritually, the Muslim Ummah is seen as
being inﬁnite, but the powerful regimes of the Muslim
world almost without exception not only themselves
perpetrate oppression, but choose to work hand in hand
with the US and the UK in their “war on terror”. (Peirce,
2008)
The structural nature of the injustices that Muslim commu-
nities face has been described by others (Pantazis and Pemberton,
2009) and in a wider sense by the civil liberties group Liberty who
write of the “New Suspect Community” and make a point about
the media playing a role in “fostering stereotypes of Muslims as
the other” (Said, 2003).
The notion of Muslims being targeted by the state has been
questioned by some, and explicitly by Steven Greer. Rather than
accepting the assertion of a “suspect community”, Greer claims
that any suspicion on Muslims and heightened Islamophobia is
caused to politically violent incidents rather than being a result of
wider media and political narratives around Muslims and Islam
(Greer, 2010: 1187). Greer was responding to the point put
forward by Pantazis and Pemberton (2009) that a “suspect
community” had been created because ofthe exceptional policy
and legislation that followed acts of political violence—and they
followed this with a further response to Greer by arguing that the
deﬁnition of a “suspect community” changes with time and
cannot be reduced to race (Pantazis and Pemberton, 2011: 1059).
In his assessment of the work of Pantazis and Pemberton,
Francesco Ragazzi explains how they do not conceive of the
“suspect community” as being a legal category, but rather as a
sociological experience of the experience of communities with the
law. The construction is thus “racialised” as signiﬁers are used to
identify potential threats:
They deﬁne suspect community as a sub-group of the
population that is singled out for state attention as being
“problematic”. Speciﬁcally in terms of policing, individuals
may be targeted, not necessarily as a result of suspected
wrong doing, but simply because of their presumed
membership in the group. Race, ethnicity, religion, class,
gender, language, accent, dress, political ideology or any
combination of these factors may serve to delineate the
subgroup’s characteristics. (Ragazzi, 2016: 728)
In this sense it is important to understand that the system of
laws and policies have been structured to ﬁnd guilt for crimes that
did not previously exist in the criminal justice system. As stated
by Ragazzi, Britain’s counter-terrorism policy operates predomi-
nantly as a factor of political demobilisation (Ragazzi, 2016). This
notion is further reiterated by Sabir (2017), who argues that:
…counter-terrorism policy is about excluding and pre-
emptively incapacitating individuals and groups by draw-
ing on sophisticated and highly coercive surveillance and
propaganda practices targeted at not only those considered
to be “future” terrorists but those individuals and
communities who speak through the “language of Islam”
Social control or coercion, manifests in discussions of Muslim
communities centred on engagement—that is, to what extent
Muslims should play a role in assisting the government’s
narrative on the “threat” of terrorism? Think-tanks such as
RAND had been pushing for “moderate” Muslim voices through
their notion of “civil-democratic Islam” (Benard, 2003). This was
challenged by communities in the United Kingdom, who pushed
for wider as opposed to “representative” engagement (Merali,
2007). This debate was central to the positioning of CAGE on
“securitization” issues. In other words, there should not be a
single point of government contact within Muslim communities,
to represent the issues of those diverse communities.
These debates are not new in contexts of repression and CAGE
has sought to learn from historical movements that have sought
to ﬁght repression and resist oppression. The experience of those
impacted by the policies of Apartheid in South Africa, or the
Black civil rights movement in the United States, were crucial as
CAGE opted for independence as the model for its existence. By
instituting a mandate of ﬁnancial and political independence, our
expression of the voices of survivors would be authentic to their
experience and thus lift them from disenfranchisement to
empowerment. From this vantage point, we would be best placed
to hold authorities to account. It is also through that
independence though, that the state seeks to ﬁnd alternative
modalities of control (Boycoff, 2007: 284).
Exchanges between the celebrated African–American sports-
men Jackie Robinson and Paul Robeson during the black civil
rights movement is just one case highlighting how independence
is central to notions of empowerment. Robeson, the leading black
actor and singer during the 1940s, was viliﬁed by the state for his
anti-establishment positions—to the extent that he was subjected
to a McCarthyite with-hunt with repercussions, such has having
his passport conﬁscated. Mike Marqusee suggested during this
period the key battle was that between authentic black men vs.
black men “staged for white men”. In the context of the
McCarthyite House of Un-American Activities, the debate was
reduced to the question: where do the loyalties of black America
lie? (Marqusee, 2005: 36). Robinson was considered, “the white
man’s hero” by Malcolm X (Marqusee, 2005: 78). He was pitted as
the ideal black man because of his condemnation of those he
considered to be “extremist” in their opposition to “white”
America. None of this was to any avail for Robinson, as after J
Edgar Hoover launched his Counter-Intelligence Program
(COINTELPRO) in August 1967, he was perhaps ironically
included as a “dangerous black nationalist” despite his presenta-
tion as the foil to Robeson (Marqusee, 2005: 193).
Experiences such as those of Robinson and Robeson helped to
place CAGE’s understanding of resistance within a wider
structural context—that notions of justice, equity, equality and
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morality are not restricted to the ﬁeld of law, but rather traverse
every aspect of civil society. CAGE understood that calling for
justice and accountability, would mean that we would be
decried as somehow anti-British, or anti-Western, even while
our critique was also levelled against authority in the “East”. This
identity of resistance is forged out of a particular form of
knowledge that the modalities of oppression cannot be separated
from one another easily. Political and media narratives are linked
to policymaking, which is associated to public perceptions, and
intertwined with jury trials, which are closely tied to public sector
employees under a statutory duty to inform—all of this
culminates to give form to the structural racism—through
repression and coercion.
CAGE predicted that the climate of fear would self perpetuate a
structural form of Islamophobia, lending itself to discrimination
(Hooper, 2016). The focus of the organisation, therefore, was to
maintain an ethos that focused on due process of law, but derived
from the strength and spirituality of being a Muslim. The key to
change for the organisation was not representation in the
corridors of power, but ﬁrst building a sense of equal citizenry
before the law that did not equivocate on rights, even for the most
hated sections of society.
As with the Robinson/Robeson debate, issues of representation
are not new. CAGE’s resistance to the excesses of national
security policy is not predicated on a desire to see Muslims in
“power” or “represented” within elite ranks, but rather can be
found rooted in its Islamic ethos—one that places primacy
on human dignity—a foundation of the Islamic social contract.
From this starting point, CAGE’s relationship is ﬁrst with
its own communities, listening to their concerns and assisting
survivors of abuse and their families. The organization’s
commitment to independence allows CAGE the opportunity to
transcend concerns over conﬂicted interests, leaving us free to
engage in accountability processes, whether political, legal or
through public discourse. This transcendence however also
meant that CAGE was pitting itself against the received wisdoms
of the state—effectively the epistemology that the state had
chosen (which will be discussed at greater length in the next
section).
Resisting structural islamophobia in practice
The policies and practices that have been used against CAGE, and
which this article will highlight in this section are not new. Whilst
there is an entire body of literature talking about how the
practices being used in the War on Terror were initially trialled in
the colonies they have also been used against domestic
populations and communities. One community is the Black
Power movement in the United States. To highlight how the
treatment and targeting of CAGE has some striking parallels with
the way this movement was treated, CAGE launched a national
tour of the FBI Counter-Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO)
that was used between the 1950s to the 1970s. With speakers from
the United States, CAGE warned that the United Kingdom was
developing similar practices, to shut down civil society that
sought to hold the government to account (CAGE, 2012).
COINTELPRO was used to not only inﬁltrate and surveil civil
rights groups in the United States, but also to actively use the
apparatus of the state to shut them down. It is then, not without
some irony, that in 2015 Martin Bright wrote an article for the
Spectator claiming, “Cage, the Islamic-focussed advocacy orga-
nisation, is the new equivalent of the Black Panthers” (Bright,
2015). The signiﬁcance of this history was perhaps best described
by Alicia McWilliams, the aunt of David Williams who was
convicted of terrorism offences as part of the FBI planned
Newburgh 4 plot in the United States:
COINTELPRO. The Black Panthers. The use of informants
in churches, back in the 1940s and 1950s. This is
happening all over again. But now the proﬁle is Muslims.
If just has a different name, and they’re using
different terms. (cited in Kundnani)
The state has in effect resurrected COINTELPRO in the form
of the Prevent strategy in the UK, with its brand of intervention
called Countering-Violent Extremism more globally. For Arun
Kundnani, the political and cultural disaffection is read as
markers of radicalisation:
Having conceived of radicalization in this way, tackling it
implies the mass surveillance of the religious and political
lives of Muslim populations. In the US, thousands of
informants in Muslim communities have been recruited to
this end. In the UK, non-police public service providers are
drawn in the process of gathering intelligence on those
suspected of radicalism. In both countries the state has
criminalised expressions of Islamist ideology. Sting opera-
tions in the US have been deployed against those thought
to be travelling on a radicalization journey. The grim
legacies of COINTELPRO-style countersubversion policing
has been revived. (Kundnani, 2014)
Programmes such as COINTELPRO ﬁnd their roots in the
surveillance societies created in the aftermath of the French
Revolution, as the European nations attempted to surveil the
threat posed by those they deemed to be anarchists—a new era of
repression based on the state of exception that had emerged
(Zamoyski, 2015: xvi). For the ﬁrst time, Europe witnessed
formalised policing, systems of informants, and interventions of
the state into policing the ideas taught in schools and universities
(Zamoyski, 2015: 33). These historical examples are all manifes-
tations of what Jules Boycoff referred to as the “four mechanisms
of repression”: resource depletion, stigmatization, divisive dis-
ruption and intimidation (Boycoff, 2007: 293). These four
mechanisms are actualised by the state through what Boycoff
further refers to as the “action modes” of repression:
 Direct violence
 Public prosecutions and hearings
 Employment deprivation
 Surveillance and break-ins
 Inﬁltration, “badjacketing”, and the use of agent provocateurs
 “Black propaganda”
 Harassment arrests
 Extraordinary rules and laws
 Mass media manipulation
 Mass media deprecation (Boycoff, 2007: 304)
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a detailed
explanation of Boycoff’s modelling, for the purposes of under-
standing the structural racism and repression of CAGE, it is clear
that the organisation has been subjected to a number of the action
modes. This article now proceeds to highlight how some of these
have articulated themselves in practice, and the ways CAGE has
sought to resist them.
Resisting the politics of condemnation. The civil war in Syria
and emergence of the Islamic State (ISIS) resulted in CAGE being
invited to present an alternative narrative in the media. We saw
this as an opportunity to help establish a new baseline by which
terrorism and political violence could be understood. On 30
January 2014, the author was invited to a discussion on Channel 4
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News on why individuals fought in Syria, and why they should
not necessarily be criminalised for doing so—our starting point
was that engaging in foreign conﬂicts meant that individuals
could be prosecuted for war crimes when they engaged in atro-
cities. The further point was made that there was a dissonance in
the way British-Israelis who trained and fought for Israel were
treated in relation to their non-criminalisation (Newman, 2014).
CAGE had begun the process of injecting narratives into a public
discourse that challenged the prevailing assumption that those
travelling abroad proved to be a potential threat to the United
Kingdom and therefore tougher laws were required to deal with
the problem.
The narrative around CAGE providing expertise on issues,
however, changed dramatically on 14 August 2014, when
Channel 4 News again invited the author to discuss a
humanitarian corridor for Yazidi refugees under international
law. Switching topic at the end of the interview, the presenter
Matt Frei asked if the author supported the establishment of a
Caliphate or supported ISIS. Shocked by the question, the author
chose to express his displeasure with Frei for the Islamophobic
nature of the question and the reasons why he felt it to be
inappropriate—that the question had no locus to the discussion
and was only directed at the interviewee because he was Muslim
(Frei, 2014). CAGE, in other words, was being asked to condemn
the atrocities of those with whom they had no relationship.
Condemnation is a phenomenon that has been highlighted by the
British Islamic scholar Ismail Ibrahim, who wrote a detailed tract:
“75 Reasons Why Muslims Must Stop With Their Terrorism
Condemnation Ritual” after mosques in Batley condemned the
killing of Jo Cox MP, despite it having been carried out by a non-
Muslim man:
I believe this was an inadvertent spillover from what can be
described as the “condemnation culture” of Muslims
against the terrorism that is done in their name. It is a
trend that has burdened Muslims for 15 years, ever since
the 9/11 attacks, in which Muslims genuinely felt Islam’s
name could have been tarnished by not speaking out. Now,
it is a phenomenon that Muslims—especially in the West—
have allowed themselves to be consumed by, either
willingly or unsuspectingly. (Ibrahim, 2016)
CAGE again found itself in the spotlight in February 2015. At a
press conference organised by CAGE, which went live to over
600 million viewers across a range of networks across the
world, Muhammad Emwazi (dubbed “Jihadi John” in the
media) was being discussed, and especially how he had been
harassed by the police and the security agencies (CAGE,
2015). Emwazi was the man alleged to have been responsible
for the unlawful executions of journalists and aid workers in areas
under ISIS control. This resulted in an unprecedented backlash
against CAGE by the press and politicians, most notably in the
United Kingdom. Claims were made that the organisation was
apologising for Muhammad Emwazi and therefore his killing of
civilians. What was never acknowledged was that the opening
comments of the press conference paid tribute to the victims of
Muhammed Emwazi’s actions, and throughout the press
conference, calls were made for him to be prosecuted for war
crimes. Assessing the treatment of CAGE, a detailed response
was written by academics David Miller, Narzanin Massoumi and
Tom Mills:
Qureshi’s comments were seized upon and shamelessly
distorted by the right-wing press. The Telegraph, for
example, reported that Qureshi had said that “Emwazi is
‘extremely gentle’ ”, removing the past tense from his
comments, which had made clear he was referring to
Emwazi before his apparent “radicalisation”…
The organisation's representatives were in fact unequivocal
in their condemnation of “Jihadi John” and the violence of
ISIS. In an interview on Sky News, Cage spokesperson Cerie
Bullivant said: “nobody here is apologising or trying to
make an excuse for what happened… We are shocked
when we see beheadings… I am shocked by something as
brutal as this... everybody should be held accountable for
any torture that they do or any killings”. Yet Cage has
continually faced claims that it is in some way responsible
for, or has condoned, such acts. (Massoumi et al., 2015)
CAGE was constantly called to play the politics of condemna-
tion—something we felt worked against the interest of our
communities—as our concern was that it would establish a notion
that somehow we were culpable. Further than that, it presupposed
a lack of humanity; that Muslims condoned unless they publicly
condemned. The discussions turned quickly from what CAGE
was saying, to indeed what we were not—and this was most
evident at an interview the author conducted with Andrew Neil
on his late night show (Prince, 2015). The questions started on
the work of CAGE and around the topic of “Jihadi John” but soon
the author was being asked to condemn Islamic scholars for
opinions they may or may not hold. CAGE’s commitment to
reject the politics of condemnation led to assumptions about
positions that organisation takes on Islam that have no bearing on
the organisation’s work or indeed the non-Muslims who work for
CAGE (Prince, 2015).
The allegation that CAGE does not condemn recently
resurfaced by Baroness Sayeeda Warsi, who, in her new book,
argues that while CAGE does important work, its refusal to
condemn acts of terrorism left a dangerous example for young
people (Warsi, 2017, 257). What Warsi and others fail to explain,
however, is what impact condemnations have on communities. In
other words, to what extent do young British citizens who are of
the Muslim faith feel that it is necessary for them to condemn acts
of terrorism, and to see leading organisations do so? Also, what
message does it send to the rest of society, that an expectation of
owning a particular act of violent criminality is connected to a
faith practised by close to 2 billion people? The lack of answers by
those who promote a “condemnation culture” leaves us somewhat
perplexed as to its role in promoting citizenry of Muslims and
social cohesion—in our view it further leads to the dehumanisa-
tion and criminalisation of Muslims by placing false expectations
on how they should behave.
CAGE’s refusal to condemn acts as a site of resistance to
reframe the debate around citizenry and cohesion—it is part of
the process of what we determine to be a balancing of cultural
expectations within UK society. CAGE resists the trend of what is
considered to be “normal” or “expected” as a means of
highlighting how structural Islamophobia is ever-present in such
debates—ultimately this therefore becomes an act of “counter
hegemonic” resistance. Engaging in such forms of resistance, and
by highlighting deeply Islamophobic and common-sense prac-
tices such as “condemning” have not been without consequence. I
will now brieﬂy demonstrate some of the more coordinated
actions that have been taken against CAGE to try and silence
them and dry them of their ﬁnancial resources and support.
Resisting ﬁnancial pressure. The narrative constructed around
CAGE and disseminated by politicians and the right-wing media
has resulted in an environment where organisations such as
Amnesty International and our former funders, The Joseph
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Rowntree Charitable Trust and Roddick Foundation, were pres-
sured to dissociate from us. This meant little to CAGE, in respect
that we had no formal working relationship with Amnesty and
because of our bank accounts having been closed (covered later in
relation to the 2014 arrest of Moazzam Begg), could not receive
grant funding anyway. Funders found themselves in a difﬁcult
position and despite internal calls saying that public dissociation
was not what they wanted, the public outcry was too strong to
resist (Rawlinson, 2015). The irony of this, of course, was not lost
on us, as we were being castigated for asking questions to the state
about the treatment of a former client who was allegedly involved
in politically motivated violence, whereas in the context of Ireland
and South Africa, Amnesty had supported individuals who had
taken part in acts of political violence (Massoumi et al., 2015).
Even the charity sector exposed a double standard in the expec-
tations that surround Muslims appearing in public life. Had these
organisations assessed the matter outside of the hysteria directed
at them, they would have perhaps based their decisions on what
we actually said, rather than what was not said or falsely reported
(Cook, 2015).
Among the hundreds of cases of those arrested without due
reason, CAGE Outreach Director Moazzam Begg was arrested for
alleged terrorism-related activities in Syria one year before the
Muhammad Emwazi press conference, in February 2014. HM
Treasury immediately froze Begg’s assets, and at the same time
Barclays Bank froze the accounts of CAGE and those within the
organisation who had accounts with the bank. This began a
process by which CAGE would come to resist the state’s attempts
to interfere, and go onto recognise how much support they had
from Muslim communities at home and abroad.
CAGE received a letter from HM Treasury dated 14 March
2014, explaining that as Begg had been designated under Section
4(2) of the Terrorism Asset Freezing Act 2010, measures would
need to be taken by the organisation to remove his name as a
signatory to the account. The freezing, and ultimately closing of
the CAGE account led to a loss of £3,000 per month in small
standing order donations that had been set up by supporters of
the organisation. This was exacerbated by two signiﬁcant donors,
The Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust and the Roddick
Foundation, not being able to provide us with funds that they
had cleared to support the organisation. It also gave the
perception that somehow, CAGE’s activities were suspect and
delegitimized.
Dealing with the ﬁnancial situation CAGE was forced to take a
back seat as our colleague had also been detained by British police
for suspected terrorism offences. Working day and night, our
priorities were ﬁrst and foremost to ﬁnd Moazzam Begg legal
representation; ensure his family were being taken care of; design
a public campaign and bring communities across the United
Kingdom together in support, and of course, to work for his
release. CAGE’s resistance to the state lay in our conﬁdence of
Moazzam Begg as never having been interested in terrorism, and
as someone who successfully managed to help young people steer
away from violence as a solution to their problems. On 1 October
2013, charges were dropped against Begg (Casciani, 2013).
With no money coming into the organisation and no ability to
access our funds, our staff of seven employees agreed to work
without a salary to keep the organisation open for business.
CAGE was forced to make its plight public through email shots
and social media—expressing the need for emergency cash
payments and even arranging for cash to be picked up from
certain points in London. The organisation was able to raise
enough to cover its running costs. CAGE has managed to
continue for 3 years without a bank account, being reliant on cash
donations to survive—all of which come from communities
within the United Kingdom. CAGE resisted the state ﬁnancially,
by being reliant on its support base—one that does not donate in
large amounts, but rather in small individual donation. So far, in
the last 2 years alone, we have managed to raise over £400,000
this way; an indication, I believe, of how much support CAGE has
at the grassroots level.
When the Muhamad Emwazi press conference was to take
place the following year in February 2015, further pressure was
applied to CAGE. Here, the Charity Commission wrote to the
organisations that had previously funded CAGE and demanded
that the organisations would never “associate” with CAGE again
—even in the future. We decided to judicially review the decision
of the Commission as it was felt that such a challenge would
beneﬁt other charities where the Charity Commission over-
stepped its boundaries (Ramesh, 2015b). At the High Court, the
Charity Commission requested to settle out of court which we
agreed to on the basis that certain express guarantees were given
—the Commission agreed that they could not fetter the activities
of foundations to fund CAGE (Ainsworth, 2015).
In subsequent revelations through the legal case, it was revealed
the extent to which different parts of the state worked
cooperatively to undermine CAGE’s work by placing pressure
on the Charity Commission to shut down the organisation’s
funding—this was particularly telling through political lobbying
by members of Parliament (Cook, 2015). The victory though was
not just in the favour of CAGE but in the interests of the whole
charity sector. It showed that the actions of a small organisation
brave enough to challenge undue inﬂuence can have a positive
impact for the whole of civil society. The intervention by the
Charity Commission would become only one example of how the
state has the ability to interfere with the activities of civil society,
but with the Prevent strategy, a part of the UK government’s
wider CONTEST counter-terrorism policy, there were wider ways
in which the state has sought to undermine resistance and, by
default, undermine the small amount of freedom within civil
society as a whole.
Learning from our actions (on our own terms). The commit-
ment CAGE has to its ethics has meant that on occasion, we have
not been able to play by the standard of behaviour “expected” of
Muslims in the United Kingdom. This does not mean however
that we are not willing to be reﬂexive about where we have made
mistakes—evidenced by CAGE conducting an external review
that was published publicly after the period of media viliﬁcation
because of the Muhammad Emwazi press conference. It was an
exercise in self-reﬂection and accountability. As an organisation
that is funded by the donations of the public, we felt we had a
duty to catalogue and learn from our mistakes (Ramesh, 2015a, b)
as well as hold ourselves to account and fulﬁl our ethical obli-
gations. Outside of the beating drums of those who used the
occasion to demonise us, there were friendly voices who continue
to support CAGE, but questioned the way in which we made our
decisions surrounding the press conference. We listened to those
voices carefully and responded appropriately considering the
publicity that surrounded CAGE’s work. Thus, recognition of our
mistakes was on our own terms, and despite the viliﬁcation, the
public continued to support CAGE both actively and ﬁnancially.
What was perhaps most tragic for CAGE in this entire period,
was that we had spent months and (in the case of our Outreach
Director Moazzam Begg) even made efforts from prison, to try
and save the life of Emwazi’s victim, Alan Henning (Begg, 2015).
Begg’s previous appeals for Christian Peace Makers resulted in
their release when held by al-Qaida in Iraq (the group that would
later become ISIS) and so there was conﬁdence that had the
government permitted an appeal, it would have worked (Begg,
2015). We organised the media to run public messages calling on
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Alan Henning to be released, as well as the wife of a Muslim
doctor who was killed by Bashar al-Assad’s forces to make a
public appeal for Henning’s life. It was, however, with great
sorrow and regret that our efforts came to no fruitful end. Our
ability to assist was lost within the hate being directed towards us
—a lesson that resisting prevailing narratives comes at a cost
when faced with state repression and structural racism; not just
for those who do the ﬁghting but those innocent people like
Henning caught in the midst of political point-scoring and
posturing.
Liberal complicity in structural islamophobia
In the previous section, this article demonstrated the ways in
which action has been taken against CAGE and the suspect
community. Here, the article now shifts it attention to
demonstrating how such actions are not possible without the
support of liberal groups and organisations, who, in the name of
protecting our liberties and rights end up, in practice, being
complicit in “epistemic” or structural violence targeted at
Muslims (Spivak, 1987). In other words, in addition to those
who point to Muslims as a threat and construct them as
suspicious while calling for them to be publically and openly
disciplined and controlled (see Mills et al., 2011) it is worth
assessing the ideas and actions of those who claim neutrality. This
is important as claiming neutrality, as shall become clear, is not
only a political position within itself but it is a position that
permits and enables inequality and injustice to continue largely
unchecked. To understand how this operates in practice, we can
assess the actions and statements of David Anderson QC; the
former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation who is
chosen and appointed by the government. The Muslim Council
of Britain, one of the largest Muslim umbrella groups in the
United Kingdom also serves as an interesting case study.
In a lecture delivered to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg on
11 October 2016 entitled “Terrorism, Tolerance and Human
Rights”, David Anderson is on record as noting the following:
Those laws need, ﬁrstly to be strong. They have to identify
and punish the extremists who espouse violence—the
thousands, in my country, who are motivated by either
residual grievances in Northern Ireland, by the extreme
right wing or by militant Islam. (Anderson, 2016)
I will go on to show that within this one paragraph, there is a
duality between the “epistemic crisis of counter-terrorism”
(Jackson, 2015) and its link to structural Islamophobia
(Schwartz, 2017).
For Anderson, the laws need to be “strong” because of
prejudice against Muslims heightening, and thus strong laws
ward off “vigilantism” as there is a perception that something is
being done (Anderson, 2016). This does not tell us much about
the actual danger allegedly posed by Muslims in the United
Kingdom, nor are we offered any justiﬁcation for his proposal of
“stronger” laws in western societies—indeed his only ﬁgure of the
threat, are the 28,300 deaths—the majority taking place in
Muslim majority countries. He makes no mention of why the
“strong” laws are needed for a western context.
Anderson is not alone in his construction of a Muslim “threat”.
The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) for example, have adopted
a similar approach. In the MCB’s “Response to the Counter-
Terrorism and Security Bill” (2015) their Assistant Secretary
General Miqdaad Versi began by “strongly” supporting the
government’s approach to stricter counter-terrorism measures.
More signiﬁcantly, Versi goes onto reassert the claim that “…the
threat of terrorism and extremism continues to blight our
communities” (Versi, 2015). Like Anderson then, Miqdaad Versi
provides little evidence to suggest what the MCB’s assessment of
the actual threat of terrorism within the West is based on.
Anderson seems to be suggesting that a public display of
strength by the state will reduce the likelihood of “vigilantism”
against Muslims:
If the authorities are powerless to act against it [terrorism],
some will be tempted to vigilantism… (Anderson, 2016)
It is telling that he does not refer to violence against Muslims—
something which he says he is trying to stop—as “hate-crime”
or Islamophobia but rather refers to it as “vigilantism’; as if
there were almost an element of truth behind the fears
of the hate-criminals or “vigilantes”. Violence by Muslims, on
the other hand, is treated as something exceptional since it is
driven by an ideology which he calls the, “murderous ideology of
Salaﬁ jihadism”, and recommends it be directly countered
(Anderson, 2016). In helping shape his understand around the
so-called drivers of politically motivated violence used by
Muslims, he turns to Muslims as a way of giving himself
legitimacy. The people he consults, however, are telling: King
Mohammed VI of Morocco, Matthew Wilkinson of the Cam-
bridge Muslim College, and ﬁnally Maajid Nawaz of the Quilliam
Foundation (Anderson, 2016). These voices exist in a securitised
narrative of Muslim communities—they have all assisted in their
own ways, to perpetuate the myth of the existential Muslim
threat.
King Mohammed VI is given protection by Anderson through
the claim that he is a direct descendent of the Prophet
Muhammad. Matthew Wilkinson is cited as a source, one who
has only ever appeared to give evidence in court at the request of
the UK Crown Prosecution Service and has had his credentials
called into question on a number of occasions throughout
terrorism trials (Brittain and Qureshi, 2011; Thibeault, 2015).
Finally and most surprisingly, Anderson relies on Maajid Nawaz
from the Quilliam Foundation to make points about the future of
engagement—but he is a ﬁgure who is considered to be extremely
controversial and divisive (Miller and Sabir, 2013; Shariatmadari,
2015).
Anderson attempts to discipline Islam and Muslims by
deploying Muslim voices that he approves of and feels are best
placed to make political points about who they are and how they
should be “treated”. This is reminiscent of the critique of David
Cameron’s Munich Speech by Professor Brian Klug, whose words
could equally apply to Anderson:
Thus, he disavows the view of Islam and the West that we
associate with a Bernard Lewis or a Samuel Huntington.
Again, this seems like a defence of Islam against its
enemies. However, as we have seen, his way of reconciling
“Islam and the West” is to make the former ﬁt for purpose.
Defending Islam, denying that it is the “root of the
problem,” he is discipling it, keeping it within the bounds,
barring it from the political realm, conﬁning it to peaceful
and devout observance, rendering it “safe” - so that it does
not pose a threat to “us”. (Klug, 2015, 71)
From this view, what we ﬁnd is that David Anderson QC can
be situated squarely within the ranks of those who practice
epistemic violence and therefore contribute to the disciplining of
Muslims through a framework that is protected by liberal
language and ideas. We thus end up returning to Boycoff’s
notion of repression (Boycoff, 2007) where liberals end up
reinforcing and participating in the legitimation of structural
violence.
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Prevent—the need to do “something”. Liberals seemingly
operate within a particular framework that is set by the State.
They start with the assumption that the threat is precisely as the
government set it out. Their point of disagreement largely rests
on the methods with which it is implemented, and the potential
negative impacts that may occur. Liberals very rarely will attempt
to question the underlying narrative of the government.
In the context of the Prevent strategy, they claim that it should
not be disproportionally targeted at the whole Muslim commu-
nity, only the “bad Muslims”. Laws are needed but we need to
ensure that they are “proportionate” (Versi, 2016). In other
words, liberals and people like Versi and Anderson do not
question the foundations of what the state is doing and neither
the principles that guide the counter-terrorism infrastructure.
There is nearly always an emphasis on the “need to provide an
alternative” as a means of seeming to moderate in response to
government excess (Versi, 2016).
Since the inception of the Prevent strategy, CAGE has been
ﬁghting this programme on the basis that it criminalises thoughts
and beliefs (CAGE, 2011). Ever since the strategy was placed on a
statutory footing, forcing all public sector workers to watch those
under their care for signs of “radicalization”, we have been
particularly interested in the impact of the policy. CAGE’s
resistance to the state is based on our assessment that the entire
policy is based on a false epistemology, and thus the conclusions
and policies derived will only harm communities, not help them.
Despite Freedom of Information Act requests regarding the
Prevent strategy training and materials, no information on the
inner workings of the strategy has yet been provided under claims
of national security. CAGE’s commitment to accountability
meant that we were interested in not only being able to see the
material, but also being able to have a public debate about its
efﬁcacy. In July 2015, after individuals approached the organisa-
tion expressing discomfort over what was being taught, CAGE
publicly leaked the ﬁrst set of Prevent training materials (CAGE,
2015b), and it did so again 6 months later (CAGE, 2016)—this
was only after continual Freedom of Information denials by the
government to release the material on the grounds of national
security.
At the same time, hundreds of cases began to ﬁlter through of
young people in particular, who had been reported to Prevent, or
at least been suspected of being “radicals” because of an
environment created by Prevent. These cases strongly suggested
that everyday suspicion and bigotry against Muslims was
escalating (CAGE, 2015c). One case study was of a student who
no longer felt safe to go to the doctor:
I felt as if my doctor was acting like some kind of spy for
the government. I know a little bit about the way all of this
PREVENT stuff works, and honestly believed that my
doctor was ﬁshing for some information about me to pass
on to someone else. (CAGE, 2015c)
While the publication and media attention of cases where
Prevent had failed as a policy were important, CAGE felt that
these were still failing to address the heart of the issue. Our
resistance to Prevent was not on the basis that there was bad
practice, but that it was a bad solution to an ever worse diagnosis.
In 2016 we changed our emphasis, and concentrated on
ascertaining the empiricism that built Prevent and to establish
the extent to which it was scientiﬁcally sound. This process led us
to the Extremism Risk Guidance 22+ (ERG22+)—a government
study by psychologists working within the Home Ofﬁce that laid
out how the government felt it could scientiﬁcally justify its view
on the processes of radicalization—but also predict future
behaviour in what it termed the pre-criminal space (CAGE,
2016b). Although the study was and is still hidden through claims
of national security, CAGE managed to track down a journal
article based on the study, and with the assistance of psychologists
and specialists, were the ﬁrst organisations to highlight and
critique the very foundation of the Prevent programme.
Whenever CAGE has raised issues at a governmental level,
instead of responding directly to the issues that we are raising, the
government and media have instead sought to respond through
ad hominem attacks against the individuals and organization
(Bracchi and Lemanski, 2015). Although the information we
presented regarding the ERG22+ was well documented and raised
at the highest levels of government, parliamentarians instead
chose to focus on CAGE’s lack of condemnation of terrorism
attacks and ignored the evidence we presented. Perhaps the entire
discussion of this article then, can be summarised into one
speciﬁc incident: CAGE being invited to give evidence before the
Parliamentary Home Affairs Select Committee on the topic of
Extremism. CAGE accepted the invitation, and instead of
focusing on the useful contribution that we were making to
assist the panel on the ERG22+ process, they instead chose to
attack the organisation in what can only be described as a
McCarthyite witch hunt—condensed into Keith Vaz MP saying
to CAGE Director Dr Adnan Siddiqui, “If you do not condemn,
then you must condone.” (Home Affairs Committee, 2016) It is
precisely these platitudes that CAGE have been resisting since the
beginning of the War on Terror and will continue to do so.
Conclusion
CAGE’s resistance is not limited to accountability and to advocate
for communities that have borne the brunt of highly violent and
coercive policies since 9/11. It also seeks to question the very
foundation of the ideas and practices that are implemented,
mostly without question or scrutiny by so-called Muslim
“gatekeeper” organizations or from independent scrutiny offered
by liberals such as the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism
Legislation. However, by doing this, CAGE continues to face
signiﬁcant pressure, whether this be through the very public
demand that we condemn politically motivated violence, through
the use of ﬁnancial pressure brought to bear on us or whether
through direct and overt acts of coercion and violence being used
against our staff such as Moazzam Begg. Despite these challenges,
expectations and pressures, CAGE has and will continue to ﬁght
the power, regardless of whether this power articulates itself
physically or structurally.
In 1989, the US-based artist Chuck D of the rap group Public
Enemy says “Fight the power. We’ve got to ﬁght the powers that
be”. When the author reads these words, ﬁghting the power does
not mean that he or CAGE have set themselves up in opposition
to the state for no reason or because it may be “cool” to do so. For
CAGE, their activism and resistance is driven by the desire to
speak truth to power—but as was the case with Chuck D, with
purpose. CAGE are guided by the notion that the greatest struggle
is for us to be engaged in an active process of truth speaking. Of
course, this course of action by CAGE has led it to suffer from
consistent attacks and viliﬁcation. Our starting point is that we
are telling a story about who we are, where we come from, and
where we are going. By knowing ourselves, we not only seek to
ﬁght unfair power, injustice and inequality but, as instructed by
the Prophet Muhammad, declare that the greatest jihad (struggle)
is to speak a word of truth to power (Ibn Hanbal, 2012: 18449).
This form of ethical representation has led us into hot water.
Accusations of being terrorist sympathisers are often directed
towards us (McMicking, 2015; Home Affairs Committee, 2016),
but this is nothing historically new. During the black civil rights
movement, Martin Luther King Jr, Malcolm X and Huey P
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Newton held the state to account for their egregious violations of
the rights of African–Americans, and yet they were all referred to
as extremists, viliﬁed and castigated by the state. Similarly, in
South Africa, accusations of extremism and terrorism were
levelled against Steve Biko and Nelson Mandela. Their resistance
was bottom-up, from the suspect community itself, and they were
the ﬁrst to pay the price for defending the rights of their
communities.
When assessing the state’s response to CAGE through the lens
of Boycoff’s “mechanisms of repression”, her model emerges from
the media narratives decrying CAGE, the statements of politicians
seeking to harm the organization, the arrest and charging of its
members, the closure of its bank accounts. These are all
manifestations of what Boycoff summarises as resource depletion,
stigmatisation, divisive disruption and intimidation.
There is however something deeper than the actions of the state
against CAGE that must be borne in mind, as the organisation
seeks to resist—and that is the intra-community debates around
the role of resisting hegemony and structural racism. As evidenced
through the Robinson/Robeson debate, the Muslim communities
in the United Kingdom are engaged in a process of trying to
understand to what extent they have agency within their own
narrative. For some, being championed by interlocutors between
communities and the state is a way forward—for CAGE however,
that is evidence of weakness. CAGE’s starting point that Muslims
of the United Kingdom are equal citizens before the law, and that
does not just mean that there should be equal due process rights,
but that also the wider debate, discussion and narrative must also
remove the everyday suspicions and bigotry that assist in creating a
suspect community.
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